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ABSTRACT The paper tries to identify the impact of fiscal system on national 
security. The author evaluates the acting Strategy of National Security of Russia, 
analyses national fiscal policies, and contrasts different points of view on national 
fiscal security. The paper also contains a new definition of fiscal security as the 
capacity of national economy to generate tax revenues sufficient to cover the 
expenditures related to national security. To assess the role of taxes in national 
security a correlation study of tax revenues and individual types of budgetary 
expenditures in 2005–2015 was conducted. It was found that most strategic 
priorities of state funding correlate with tax revenues. However expenditures on 
national economy and environmental protection correlate with tax revenues to the 
lesser extent. Tax revenue elasticity of budgetary expenditures was calculated as 
well. The results showed a strong dependence of crime level on tax revenues of the 
state budget. The research period witnessed a growth in budgetary expenditures 
on law enforcement accompanied by a decline in crime level, and vice versa a cut 
in funding resulted in higher crime level. National defense is less dependent on tax 
revenues. Regardless of annual growth in military funding armed forces showed a 
decline in quantitative indicators
KEYWORDS National security, tax, budget, National Security Strategy, fiscal 
security, defensive capacity, public order, correlation
HIGHLIGHTS
1. Most strategic directions of Russian budget expenses have close correlation with 
the amount of tax revenues
2. The level of law enforcement and public safety in Russia directly depends on the 
amount of tax revenues to the budget
3. Russia’s defense capacity depends on the state tax income insignificantly because 
the dynamics of budget tax revenues does not influence the changes of Russia’s 
defense capacity indicators substantially
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АННОТАЦИЯ В статье исследуется влияние налоговой системы государства 
на обеспечение национальной безопасности страны: дается оценка действу-
ющей Стратегии национальной безопасности Российской Федерации, рас-
сматриваются аспекты налоговой политики государства, влияющие на обе-
спечение национальной безопасности, анализируются мнения некоторых 
исследователей, касающиеся содержания налоговой безопасности страны. 
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Introduction
The national security strategy of the 
Russian Federation (hereinafter — the 
Strategy) ratified in 2015 is the core docu-
ment of strategic planning in Russia, 
which defines the main national interests 
and priorities, as well as goals, objectives 
and domestic and foreign policy mea-
sures aimed at strengthening national 
security and long term sustainability. 
Implementation of the Strategy depends 
to a great extent on national economic 
performance. Altogether we think that 
the Strategy pays insufficient attention to 
fiscal tax system which is the key source 
of national income.
The Strategy, when viewing the ways 
to ensure national economic security, rais-
es the issue of taxes only twice. Namely, 
the Strategy considers stability of the fis-
cal system as a means to improve the at-
tractiveness of Russian legal system, fa-
cilitating business activity and healthy 
competition. Also the Strategy contains 
an objective to stimulate SMEs growth 
through the ease of tax burden. However 
the role of fiscal system is much wider 
when national security is concerned. Thus 
this paper aims at revealing the whole 
gamut of effects that fiscal system has on 
national security.
Literature review
Extant research explores individual 
aspects of the impact that fiscal system has 
on national security. Palishkina names tax 
evasion the main threat to national securi-
ty [1]. Shuvalova, Solyarik and Zakharova 
Сформулировано авторское понятие налоговой безопасности как способности 
национальной экономики генерировать налоговые поступления в объеме, до-
статочном для финансирования государственных расходов, обеспечивающих 
национальную безопасность страны. Для оценки роли налогов в обеспечении 
национальной безопасности России проводился корреляционный анализ вза-
имосвязи динамики налоговых доходов и отдельных видов государственных 
расходов за 2005–2015 гг. Выявлено, что большинство стратегических направ-
лений государственных расходов имеют тесную корреляционную зависимость 
от величины налоговых поступлений. Наименьший уровень корреляционной 
зависимости имеют расходы на национальную экономику и охрану окружа-
ющей среды. В работе также проанализирована эластичность отдельных ви-
дов расходов консолидированного бюджета России по налоговым доходам. 
Для этой цели производился расчет коэффициентов эластичности указанных 
бюджетных расходов по налоговым доходам. В результате исследования выяв-
лено, что уровень правопорядка и общественной безопасности в стране напря-
мую зависит от величины налоговых поступлений в бюджет. Наблюдаемый в 
анализируемом периоде рост бюджетных расходов на правоохранительную 
деятельность сопровождался снижением уровня преступности в стране, а сни-
жение бюджетных расходов приводило к росту преступности. Обороноспособ-
ность страны в меньшей степени зависит от налоговых поступлений. Однако, 
несмотря на ежегодное увеличение бюджетных расходов на национальную 
оборону, количественные показатели, характеризующие состояние вооружен-
ных сил страны, обычно снижались
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА Национальная безопасность, налог, бюджет, Стратегия 
национальной безопасности, налоговая безопасность, обороноспособность, 
правопорядок, корреляционный анализ
ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОЛОЖЕНИЯ
1. Большинство стратегических направлений расходов государственного бюд-
жета России имеют тесную корреляционную зависимость от величины налого-
вых доходов
2. Уровень правопорядка и общественной безопасности в России напрямую за-
висит от величины налоговых поступлений в бюджет
3. Обороноспособность России в незначительной степени зависит от налоговых 
доходов государства, так как динамика налоговых поступлений в бюджет не 
оказывает существенного влияния на изменение показателей обороноспособ-
ности страны 
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state that taxes and fiscal policy are the 
core element in national security system, 
but at the same time nowadays the fiscal 
system of the Russian Federation mainly 
presents a source of threats to economic 
security rather than a means of its achieve-
ment [2, p. 51, 54].
A number of authors use the term 
“fiscal security” defined by Pimenov as 
such a state of the economy and busi-
ness actors when they are protected from 
fiscal risks [3]. Foreign papers explore 
technical aspects of fiscal security attain-
ment. Thus Piazza studies the problem 
of low information security in electronic 
databases of the American IRS which en-
dangers the confidentiality and integrity 
of management systems and taxpayers’ 
data [4]. On the other hand most re-
searchers view fiscal security as a state 
of uninterrupted inflow of taxes to the 
state budget ensuring sufficient funding 
of necessary budgetary expenditures. 
Namely, Kostyukov and Maslov define 
fiscal security as such a condition under 
which the sum of collected taxes corre-
sponds to the sum of total planned ac-
tivities necessary to fulfill its current and 
perspective duties on the national and 
municipal levels [5, p. 119]. Common in 
their essence definitions are given by An-
ishenko [6], Fedorova [7], Kormishkina 
and Koroleva [8]. Our paper also focuses 
on the way to assess the capacity of na-
tional economy to generate tax revenues 
sufficient to cover national security re-
lated expenditures of the state.
In its turn the aggregate sum of 
budgetary expenditures backed by tax 
revenues doesn’t guarantee an effective 
performance of state functions in any 
sphere. So many researchers paid con-
siderable attention to the impact of state 
revenues and budgetary expenditures 
on various aspects of national security 
and namely the defensive capacity of 
the state.
The role of state revenues in ensuring 
the defensive capacity is pointed out by 
many researchers. Astakhov writes that 
“state finance, their assignment, func-
tions, role in reinvestment, and structure 
during the Great Patriotic War predefined 
the victory of the Soviet people” [9, p. 17]. 
A similar point of view is expressed by 
Panskov [10]. And to some extent the 
same is meant in a popularly known ex-
pression attributed to Napoleon I: “For 
war we need three things-money, money 
and more money” [11, p. 191]. Lapidus 
[12], Hebert [13], and Powers [14] re-
search separate aspects of state military 
expenditures.
Adam Smith names military expen-
ditures the most important of all state 
spending: “The first duty of the sover-
eign, that of protecting the society from 
the violence and invasion of other inde-
pendent societies, can be performed only 
by means of a military force” [15, p. 536] 
and further on, “defending the society 
from the violence and injustice of other 
independent societies, grows gradually 
more and more expensive as the society 
advances in civilization. The military 
force of the society, which originally cost 
the sovereign no expense either in time of 
peace or in time of war, must, in the prog-
ress of improvement, first be maintained 
by him in time of war, and afterwards 
even in time of peace”  [15, p. 548–549]. 
Smith calls tax revenues the key source 
of state income, thus insufficient tax reve-
nues have an adverse effect on defensive 
capacity. 
An example of how taxes affect de-
fensive capacity can be drawn from the 
peculiarities of Britain’s financial ties 
with its North-American colonies in 
the XVIII century. At that time colonies 
didn’t have their own regular military 
force and they were not regularly taxed 
as there was no need for state military 
expenditures. Thus all military expendi-
tures aimed at protection of the colonies 
were incurred by the British budget. So 
according to Smith colonies presented 
a burden rather than a benefit for their 
state: “The colonies of Spain and Portu-
gal only have contributed any revenue 
towards the defense of the mother coun-
try, or the support of her civil govern-
ment. The taxes which have been levied 
upon those of other European nations, 
upon those of England in particular, 
have seldom been equal to the expense 
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laid out upon them in time of peace, and 
never sufficient to defray that which they 
occasioned in time of war. Such colonies, 
therefore, have been a source of expense 
and not of revenue to their respective 
mother countries” [15, p. 459–460]. So in 
his book An Inquiry Into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations published 
during the American war for indepen-
dence Smith does not mention the fact 
that one of the main reasons of that war 
was the wish of local government to re-
peal the taxes levied shortly before the 
war by the British rule, taxes which the 
Great Britain considered a fair source to 
cover the military expenditures on pro-
tection of the colonies. Thus until the 
regular military was not needed the taxes 
were not needed too; and when an in-
dependent state was created the need to 
maintain the army resulted in the intro-
duction of regular taxes.
Methods
Strategic national priorities of the 
Russian Federation stated in the Strategy 
(Article 31) can be divided into 2 groups. 
The first one includes those directly re-
lated to the national security, its pro-
tection and survival of the population, 
namely the two main ones related to na-
tional defense and national and social 
security. The rest 7 priorities are related 
to national security indirectly, they rather 
support national security and they com-
prise socio-economic aspects as ensuring 
better quality of life for Russian citizens; 
economic growth; science, technology 
and education; healthcare; culture; envi-
ronmental protection and efficient use of 
natural resources; strategic stability and 
equal strategic partnership.
Such a wide interpretation of na-
tional security, encompassing along with 
military forces also the socio-economic 
aspects indirectly affecting the national 
defensive capacity, is what differentiates 
the Russian Strategy from those of other 
countries. For instance, the national se-
curity strategy of Poland contains only 
3 priorities directly aimed at strengthen-
ing the defensive capacity under NATO 
[16, p. 184–185].
There are various sources of funding 
the aforementioned strategic priorities of 
national security. The first group of prior-
ities is solely funded by the state budget 
from the tax revenues. The second group 
of priorities is financed by a combination 
of budgetary and non-budgetary sources. 
Besides some priorities, mainly the ones 
related to social policies significantly rely 
on budgetary funding, and economic pri-
orities derive their support mostly from 
non-budgetary sources. The final prior-
ity related to strategic stability and equal 
strategic partnership is a part of national 
foreign policy and is funded from the 
budget.
To assess the role of taxes in the na-
tional security system we conducted 
a correlation study between dynam-
ics of the tax revenues in the consoli-
dated national budget and funding of 
the aforementioned strategic priorities 
of Russian national security from the 
consolidated budget. Besides we exam-
ined tax revenue elasticity of budgetary 
expenditures on strategic priorities. For 
that purpose we calculated tax revenues 
elasticity coefficients of the budgetary 
expenditures.
Concerning the two main strategic 
priorities of national security (defensive 
capacity and social security) we conduct-
ed a correlation analysis between the dy-
namics of their funding and the core indi-
cators of national security in those spheres 
(namely defensive capacity; crime level). 
The resulting data allowed us to evaluate 
the extent of influence certain budgetary 
expenditures have on national security 
in Russia. The correlation study between 
various kinds of state expenditures and 
tax revenues allowed assessing the role of 
taxes in the key elements of Russian na-
tional security system — defensive capac-
ity and public order. 
Results
Figure 1 shows the flows of tax rev-
enues and the main national security-
related expenditures of Russian consoli-
dated budget in the recent period. Tax 
revenues include taxes and social security 
payments being the core source of social 
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spending which influence the national se-
curity indirectly. 
We can see that tax revenues correlate 
with some expenditures at the coefficient 
value close to 1. It means that budgetary 
expenditures changed in line with growth 
or decline of tax revenues. Altogether cer-
tain expenditures were growing over the 
period at a faster rate than the rest and 
exceeded tax revenues. So by 2015 tax rev-
enues were 1.4 times higher than in 2005, 
while state defense expenditures and so-
cial spending (mainly pension payout) 
grew 2.3 times. Correlation coefficients 
were calculated based on CPI-adjusted 
longitudinal data (in prices of 2005) to 
eliminate the interference of inflation for 
it automatically raises both tax revenues 
and budgetary expenditures. In current 
prices the coefficient value exceeded 0.9 
for all expenditures. 
A strong correlation between tax 
revenues and budget expenditures on 
strategic priorities of national security 
is proved by the analysis of tax revenue 
elasticity of expenditures (Table 2). Elas-
ticity coefficients calculated by the for-
mula (1) show the interdependence of 
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Figure 1. Tax revenues and main expenditures of consolidated budget  
of the Russian Federation in 2005–2015, current prices, billion rubles
Figure uses the data of the Federal Treasury of the RF on consolidated budget implementation  
(http://www.roskazna.ru)
Table 1
Growth rates and correlation coefficients for tax revenues and budgetary 
expenditures in 2005–2015 (in prices of 2005)
Revenues and expenditures 2015 growth rate to 2005, % Correlation coefficient
Tax revenues 139.1 –
National security 224.7 0.7185
National security and law enforcement 145.5 0.7212
National economy 202.9 0.5864
Environmental protection 135.1 0.6599
Education 155.5 0.8008
Culture, cinematography and mass media 139.2 0.7656
Healthcare and sports 160.6 0.8727
Social policies 227.9 0.6385
Table uses the data of the Federal Treasury of the RF on consolidated budget implementation 
(http://www.roskazna.ru).
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the chosen variables and illustrate how 
a change in tax revenues affects certain 
expenditures of the budget annually. The 
closer the coefficient is to 1 the higher 
the elasticity. If the coefficient equals 1 it 
means that expenditures change in line 
with tax revenues. 
/ ,
ji i
j
ji i
S TRE
S TR
∆ ∆
=
 
(1)
where Ej is elasticity coefficient of j-type 
budgetary expenditures; Sji is consolidat-
ed budget expenditures of j-type in the 
year i; ∆Sji is the change in consolidated 
budget expenditures of j-type in the year 
i; TRi is tax revenues of consolidated bud-
get in the year i; ∆TRi is the change in tax 
revenues of consolidated budget in the 
year i.
More often tax revenues correlated 
with different budgetary expenditures, 
in 56 cases out of 80 the elasticity coeffi-
cient had a positive value, which means 
that real increase in tax revenues results 
in real (inflation-adjusted) growth of bud-
getary expenditures. When the elasticity 
coefficient has a negative value it’s a sign 
of an inverse correlation of the variables, 
which was the case in the crisis year 2009 
and during the recession in 2013 and 2015 
when a decline in real tax revenues wit-
nessed an increase in budgetary expendi-
tures; an analogous situation happened in 
2010 when regardless of some increase in 
tax revenues the budgetary expenditures 
were cut. Thus in some years tax revenue 
elasticity of budgetary expenditures was 
low, only in 24 cases out of 80 the coeffi-
cient deviated from 1 at less than 50 %.
On the average during the entire pe-
riod 2 types of budgetary expenditures, 
national defense (–0.65) and social poli-
cies (–0.30), exhibit a negative tax reve-
nue elasticity. It shows their low respon-
siveness to changes in budget revenues. 
These expenditures are determined by 
national priorities and government’s pol-
icies and are independent of tax revenue 
changes. This in turn also means that 
even when budget revenues are not suf-
ficient, the cuts are made in other spheres 
rather than national defense and social 
policies. 
High elasticity reaching the value 
of 1 was exhibited by such expenditure 
types as healthcare, culture and environ-
mental protection. The volumes of fund-
ing in those types usually depend on rev-
enues and mainly on the tax revenues. 
Furthermore all types of budgetary ex-
penditures over the period (2005–2015) 
are positively tax revenue elastic at the 
value close to 1 and in the case of only 
three types the value deviated from one 
by more than 50 %.
A somewhat stabilizing role in equal-
izing the budgetary expenditure volumes 
regardless of tax revenues was played by 
the Stabilization Fund and subsequently 
by the Reserve Fund and the National 
Welfare Fund. As seen from Figure 2 ag-
gregate revenues of the consolidated bud-
Table 2
Tax revenue elasticity of consolidated budget expenditures in 2005–2015
Budget 
expenditures
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 2015  
to 2005
National defense 0.75 0.62 2.90 –0.02 –0.14 0.50 1.78 –10.87 3.22 –5.27 –0.65 1.97
Law-enforcement 1.23 0.58 3.14 –0.02 –0.14 0.25 2.60 –6.35 –1.63 7.16 0.68 1.11
National economy 1.44 1.95 6.26 –0.22 –3.41 0.58 1.49 8.45 7.73 13.65 3.79 1.80
Environmental 
protection
–0.51 0.24 1.36 0.54 –1.55 1.23 0.82 –2.69 9.62 3.63 1.27 0.92
Education 1.91 0.92 2.66 0.16 -0.28 0.47 1.17 –7.46 –0.43 4.60 0.37 1.27
Culture 1.29 0.96 3.10 0.23 0.01 0.32 0.87 –2.37 0.03 5.09 0.95 1.00
Healthcare and 
sports
1.09 1.40 0.01 0.17 –0.59 0.69 1.57 5.04 1.01 –0.15 1.02 1.34
Social policies 1.50 0.57 4.19 –0.26 1.90 –0.20 1.68 –7.86 –1.99 –2.57 –0.30 1.99
Table uses the data of the Federal Treasury of the RF on consolidated budget implementation 
(http://www.roskazna.ru)
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get exceeded the aggregate expenditures 
over 2005–2012. During this period a por-
tion of tax revenues was reserved in sta-
bilization funds and was not assigned to 
budgetary expenditures of a current year. 
Insignificant sums spent by stabilization 
funds over 2005–2007 (0.4–0.7 billion ru-
bles) were assigned to paying off the for-
eign national debt and covering the defi-
cits of the national budget and the Pension 
Fund budget. Larger sums (1.1–3.1 billion 
rubles) were spent by stabilization funds 
on implementation of prioritized expen-
ditures regardless of tax revenue decrease 
in all budgets. This explains a low depen-
dency of some expenditure types on tax 
revenue volumes.
To evaluate the effectiveness of state 
expenditures on the first group of strategic 
priorities, the ones related to defense and 
public security, we analyzed how budget-
ary spending affected the indicators char-
acterizing the two spheres. 
Indicators of defensive capacity main-
ly are classified but a few of them can be 
found in open sources. Most of the indica-
tors suggested by Bogatyrev, Makiev and 
Malyshev (2013) as the ones character-
izing national military and political situ-
ation contain classified data, such as the 
share of critically important objects (CIOs) 
protected by air and civil defense capabili-
ties using modern weapons, modern mili-
tary and specialized equipment status of 
the Armed Forces of the Russian Federa-
tion, availability of military and engineer-
ing human resources [17, p. 50]. Of all the 
suggested indicators only the ones charac-
terizing the budgetary funding of defense 
are not classified.
However international publications 
contain certain data on defensive capacity 
of Russia. International Institute for Stra-
tegic Studies publishes an annual cata-
logue of military and defensive potential 
of 170 countries (The Military Balance). 
Using these data we conducted a correla-
tion study of military expenditures and 
defensive capacity indicators of Russia 
over 2005–2015.
Figure 3 shows the dynamic of defen-
sive capacity indicators against the mili-
tary expenditures in Russia in prices of 
2005 (inflation-adjusted). The period wit-
nessed significant disarmament: the size 
of armed forces decreased by 36 %; the 
quantity of intercontinental ballistic ve-
hicles was cut down by 40 %; the number 
of combat aircrafts dropped by 31 %; only 
the number of submarines showed some 
growth — by 16 %. The process of disar-
mament paralleled a constant growth of 
budgetary expenditures on defense: they 
rose from 0.6 to 3.2 billion rubles in cur-
rent prices over 2005–2015 which equaled 
to 2.2 times in real terms.
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Figure 2. Implementation of consolidated budget of the Russian Federation  
and the volumes of stabilization funds over 2005–2015, billion rubles
Figure uses the data of the Federal Treasury of the RF on consolidated budget implementation  
(http://www.roskazna.ru), of the Ministry of Finance of the RF  
(http://minfin.ru/ru/perfomance/reservefund/statistics/balances/) , of the archives of the Ministry  
of Finance web-site; (http://old.minfin.ru/ru/stabfund/statistics/remains/index.php?id)
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The analysis paradoxically shows that 
military expenditures and defensive ca-
pacity indicators correlate inversely: the 
more budgetary funds are assigned to the 
military the less equipped and populated 
it becomes. It is supported by correlation 
coefficients values given in table 3. Mili-
tary expenditures correlate with the size 
of armed forces at the value of –0.9549 
which is a strong inverse correlation. The 
decline in the size of armed forces paral-
leled a steady decline in military expendi-
tures. A weaker correlation was exhibited 
by military expenditures and the quan-
tity of intercontinental ballistic vehicles 
(–0.7431), and the number of combat air-
crafts (–0.8427). And it is only the number 
of submarines with which military expen-
ditures correlated positively (0.6869).
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Figure 3. Defensive capacity of Russia and military expenditures over 2005–2015
Figure derived the data from: The Military Balance 2004-2005. The annual assessment of global military 
capabilities and defence economics / The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). London, UK. 2005, 
398 p.; The Military Balance 2007. The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics/ 
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). London, UK. 2007, 452 p.; The Military Balance 2009. 
The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics/ The International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS). London, UK. 2009, 488 p.; The Military Balance 2011. The annual assessment of 
global military capabilities and defence economics/ The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 
London, UK. 2011, 482 p.; The Military Balance 2012. The annual assessment of global military capabilities 
and defence economics/ The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). London, UK. 2012, 504 p.; 
The Military Balance 2013. The annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics/ The 
International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). London, UK. 2013, 572 p.; The Military Balance 2014. The 
annual assessment of global military capabilities and defence economics/ The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies (IISS). London, UK. 2014, 504 p.; The Military Balance 2015. The annual assessment of global military 
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Table 3
Growth rates and correlation coefficients 
of military expenditures  
with defensive capacity indicators  
of Russia over 2005–2015
Indicator Growth rate, % Correlation
Military 
expenditures
224.7 –
Size of armed 
forces
63.6 –0.9549
Intercontinental 
ballistic vehicles
59.5 –0.7431
Submarines 115.7 0.6869
Combat aircraft 69.2 –0.8427
A strong inverse correlation of mili-
tary expenditures and defensive capacity 
indicators supports the results of elastic-
ity study of the same variables, given in 
table 4. Elasticity coefficients were cal-
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culated by formula (2) which describes 
how the change in military expenditures 
affected the change in defensive capacity 
indicators.
/ ,i mim
i mi
M SE
M S
∆ ∆
=
 
(2)
where Em is elasticity coefficient of defen-
sive capacity indicator; Mi is defensive ca-
pacity indicator over the year i; ∆Mi is the 
variation of defensive capacity indicator 
in the year i; Smi is military expenditures in 
the year i; ∆Smi is the variation of military 
expenditures over the year i.
Elasticity was mostly negative over 
the period, in 67 % of cases, so the growth 
in military expenditures was accompa-
nied by a decline in defensive capacity 
indicators. In 3 cases the effect was neu-
tral — the elasticity coefficient was equal 
to 0. Very often, in 71 % of the cases, the 
coefficient deviated from 1 by more than 
0.5 in both directions. It speaks for a lack 
of steady correlation between military 
expenditures and defensive capacity. But 
only the elasticity study helped discover 
the stable negative effect of expenditure 
variation on the size of army and numbers 
of ICBVs and combat aircraft.
The results can be explained by a re-
cent growth in the quality of defensive 
capacity inadvertently accompanied by 
a decline in quantitative indicators, mili-
tary equipment was renewed, and armed 
forces became more prepared to combat. 
Thus it is difficult to evaluate the depen-
dence of defensive capacity on budgetary 
expenditures precisely. So we can deduce 
that higher expenditures result in higher 
defensive capacity regardless of a decline 
in quantitative indicators.
However we discovered that budget-
ary expenditures closely correlate with law 
enforcement and public security. To find 
this relationship we conducted a correla-
tion study of law enforcement expendi-
tures and 4 indicators of crime and public 
order in Russia over 2005–2015. However 
representativeness of the chosen indica-
tors could be questioned. Harry P. Hatry 
(Hatry, 1999) claims that law-enforcement 
agencies tend to tamper with monitoring 
results as they reflect their performance 
[18]. Thus we can see a conflict of inter-
ests: police are a source of information for 
statistical databases on crime, so they can 
manipulate certain indicators to hide their 
own failure. Namely they artificially cut 
down the number of crimes by refusing to 
open investigations. But we argue that the 
process of data collection eliminates total 
unreliability of crime indicators, though 
a certain lack of representativeness might 
be present. Thus the data can be used for 
the purposes of our research.
Figure 4 presents indicators of crime 
level in Russia over the period 2005–2015 
against law-enforcement expenditures of 
consolidated national budget in compa-
rable prices of 2005. The period witnessed 
a steady growth of such expenditures 
except 2010 and 2014 when the funding 
dropped slightly (by less than 5 %) and 
2015 when there was a substantial cut on 
funds (15 %). At the same time crime level 
indicators showed a decrease, with an ex-
ception of 2015 when the crime level rose 
considerably. The analysis showed a sta-
ble inverse correlation of law-enforcement 
expenditures and crime level, meaning the 
more funds is spend on law enforcement 
the better they cope with their duties.
Table 4
Military expenditure elasticity of defensive capacity indicators,  
Russia, 2005–2015
Indicator 2007 2009 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
throughout 
the period
2015  
to 2005
Size of armed forces –1.15 0.00 –0.42 –1.61 0.00 –0.73 –0.65 –1.03
Intercontinental ballistic 
vehicles –1.63 –1.57 –2.70 0.82 1.26 0.44 –0.56 –1.23
Submarines –1.56 0.21 2.02 –0.19 0.00 –0.64 –0.03 0.24
Combat aircraft –0.33 0.47 0.16 –2.78 –0.55 –1.19 –0.70 –0.80
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As seen from the results presented 
in table 5 the inverse correlation between 
budgetary funding and crime level is con-
firmed by correlation coefficients of these 
variables which are close to 1 (–0.8 and 
–0.9). So while the period was marked by 
a 46 % real growth in budget funding the 
crime level indicators showed a signifi-
cant decline, and the number of homicides 
and assaults dropped by 63 %.
Table 5
Growth rate and correlation  
of expenditures on law enforcement  
and crime level  
in Russia over 2005–2015
Indicator Growth 
rate, %
Correla-
tion
Expenditures on law 
enforcement
145.5 –
Crimes registered 67.2 –0.8913
Homicides and  
assaults registered 
37.3 –0.8920
Criminals 
apprehended
82.9 –0.8811
Persons convicted 83.5 –0.7947
Budgetary funding elasticity of crime 
level calculated by formula (3) showed 
that although the variables do not ex-
hibit constant correlation but in 65 % of 
cases it has a negative value. The least 
elastic crimes were homicides with the 
value of elasticity at –5.4, which means 
that homicide level drop outstripped the 
growth of budget funds. Results are given 
in table 6.
/ ,i lil
i li
L SE
L S
∆ ∆
=
 
(3)
where Ei is crime level elasticity coeffi-
cient; Li is crime level in the year i; ∆Li is 
the change of crime level in the year i; Sli 
is law enforcement related budgetary ex-
penditures in the year i; ∆Sli is the change 
in law enforcement related expenditures 
in the year i.
We need to note that law enforce-
ment related expenditures are very elas-
tic against tax revenues — the volume 
of such expenditures is immediately 
dependent upon the volume of tax rev-
enues of the budget. Thus there is an 
indirect relationship between tax rev-
enues and crime level and public security 
in Russia.
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Figure 4. Dynamics of crime level and expenditures on law enforcement  
in Russia over 2005–2015
Figure uses the data derived from: Russia in numbers. 2016: stat. digest. Moscow. 2016, pp. 176–178;  
Russia in numbers. 2011: Stat. digest. Moscow. 2011, p. 164–166;  
Federal Treasury of the RF on consolidated budget implementation (http://www.roskazna.ru)
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Conclusions
Results of our research identify the ex-
tent to which the fiscal system impacts na-
tional security in Russia. Implementation 
of some strategic national priorities (such 
as national and public security) depends 
on tax revenues of the budget. Thus a 
drop in tax revenues immediately results 
in funding cuts in law enforcement, which 
in turn causes crime level to rise and over-
all national security to decline.
Other strategic national priorities such 
as national defense and quality of life are 
less dependent on changes in fiscal per-
formance. Russian government funds de-
fense according to the program of military 
development regardless of the changes in 
tax revenues; thus they hardly ever influ-
ence the national defensive capacity of 
Russia. However such a funding principle 
is mainly a result of abundant financial re-
serves able to compensate the drop in tax 
revenues without cuts on defense funding.
Table 6
Law enforcement funding elasticity of crime level in 2005–2015
Offense 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Average 
over the 
period
2015 
to 
2005
Crimes registered 0.85 –0.76 –1.02 –10.46 11.55 –2.31 –0.27 –0.91 0.14 –0.46 –0.36 –1.56
Homicides and 
assaults registered 
–1.32 –2.40 –0.91 –19.76 11.17 –2.25 –0.46 –1.52 0.86 0.19 –1.64 –5.37
Criminals 
apprehended
0.52 –0.33 –0.43 –4.30 8.14 –1.66 –0.18 0.04 0.14 –0.36 0.16 –0.66
Persons convicted 0.37 0.21 –0.04 –5.39 4.62 –1.99 –0.35 –0.09 0.49 –0.11 –0.23 –0.63
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